AE323 - Safety in Chemical Plants (1-2)

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Language: en

00:00:00.000
and officials were overwhelmed and then
00:00:03.530 00:00:03.540 it became a problem as for how do you
00:00:04.910 00:00:04.920 manage so many dead bodies because you
00:00:07.760 00:00:07.770 see there is a legal process any a
00:00:09.350 00:00:09.360 natural death has to be dealt with in a
00:00:11.509 00:00:11.519 particular way not only that to add to
00:00:14.240 00:00:14.250 that was a problem of disposal of the
00:00:15.890 00:00:15.900 bodies human bodies plus animals so that
00:00:22.070 00:00:22.080 was another major crisis which we went
00:00:23.870 00:00:23.880 underwent and after two days official
00:00:27.470 00:00:27.480 figures say around three thousand people
00:00:29.509 00:00:29.519 died in the immediate aftermath of the
00:00:31.460 00:00:31.470 leak
00:00:33.729 00:00:33.739 Bhopal residents believe the real total
00:00:36.560 00:00:36.570 was much higher the estimates they said
00:00:38.810 00:00:38.820 at least seven thousand shrouds were
00:00:40.790 00:00:40.800 needed to cover the dead
00:00:43.750 00:00:43.760 but the devastation did not end with the
00:00:46.000 00:00:46.010 dead of the first few hours in fact the
00:00:52.270 00:00:52.280 real horror of that night was only just
00:00:54.910 00:00:54.920 beginning
00:01:14.370 00:01:14.380 in Calabasas from a coup an takuna can
00:02:27.340 00:02:27.350 push with 20 and that the gullible home
00:02:30.400 00:02:30.410 thank Amy happens careful that he fancy
00:02:37.270 00:02:37.280 like gas in human you mama when the
00:02:41.580 00:02:41.590 landmark of Arab see he was the absolute
00:02:46.020 00:02:46.030 value the absolute cocoa subsided it
00:02:49.539 00:02:49.549 gasps yeah went to Castle eyes
00:02:53.210 00:02:53.220 like you know J package with no I can't
00:02:58.850 00:02:58.860 a time come don't need to me have I got
00:03:01.520 00:03:01.530 any Indian yet but good I can't I be
00:03:04.970 00:03:04.980 kind of very very long time how
00:03:13.750 00:03:13.760 complaining good me can't a lockdown
00:03:26.830 00:03:26.840 Kournikova yeah yeah to make goulash
00:03:29.480 00:03:29.490 with man cut my map that way means what
00:03:32.150 00:03:32.160 I am actively yeah yeah the weapon he
00:03:34.370 00:03:34.380 can become a mutation it work Gina Pam
00:03:51.380 00:03:51.390 Carter mere formality by boutique mi
00:04:02.320 00:04:02.330 casa Cabana
00:04:03.830 00:04:03.840 T Libya the yeah yeah we can't I we can
00:04:08.360 00:04:08.370 China clever nuclear so no but here John
00:04:12.199 00:04:12.209 Kaku liber came in Jimmy have quality
00:04:16.220 00:04:16.230 time black music I love the consumer so
00:04:21.440 00:04:21.450 good even when Louie why would he been
00:04:24.290 00:04:24.300 alive
00:04:44.950 00:04:44.960 Bob how long a decoupling yeah hah yeah
00:04:48.550 00:04:48.560 hah
00:04:49.510 00:04:49.520 melanca pin book that book cover new cub
00:04:52.630 00:04:52.640 Amir Sahib in petty side girl cool San
00:04:57.640 00:04:57.650 Antonio walk with what genes can pin son
00:05:48.130 00:05:48.140 he was type in 2x
00:05:49.890 00:05:49.900 additives and accompany you he some kind
00:05:58.930 00:05:58.940 to make you I saw Salina long Carolina
00:06:06.010 00:06:06.020 Bachmann Takei from Lord of man no no we
00:06:09.370 00:06:09.380 do kicked off I say ha
00:06:14.469 00:06:14.479 in contrast with phosgene m.i.c was
00:06:17.799 00:06:17.809 stored in three vast tanks originally
00:06:20.559 00:06:20.569 buried in a concrete bunker near the
00:06:22.390 00:06:22.400 edge of the plant 40 feet long in 8 feet
00:06:26.739 00:06:26.749 in diameter each was capable of holding
00:06:29.469 00:06:29.479 42 tons of the potentially lethal
00:06:32.110 00:06:32.120 chemical
00:06:38.219 00:06:38.229 we're phosgene was a famous killer kept
00:06:41.170 00:06:41.180 in small quantities m.i.c was stored on
00:06:44.409 00:06:44.419 a scale that would kill thousands
00:06:55.850 00:06:55.860 8:45 the pipes that were being washed
00:06:59.400 00:06:59.410 started to become choked with the dirt
00:07:01.770 00:07:01.780 being carried by the water the nozzles
00:07:06.990 00:07:07.000 became blocked and water began to back
00:07:09.030 00:07:09.040 up flowing into one of the main pipe
00:07:11.490 00:07:11.500 systems that ran throughout the plant
00:07:16.140 00:07:16.150 mi sees very handy stuff it reacts to
00:07:19.110 00:07:19.120 produce particular molecules that we
00:07:22.410 00:07:22.420 probably couldn't reach easily by other
00:07:24.170 00:07:24.180 chemistry so it's really useful to the
00:07:26.880 00:07:26.890 chemist he can build things in a way
00:07:28.530 00:07:28.540 that he wouldn't otherwise be able to do
00:07:30.720 00:07:30.730 it's also reactive which means that
00:07:33.150 00:07:33.160 things that haven't happened fast we
00:07:35.070 00:07:35.080 yeah we don't need very long reaction
00:07:37.350 00:07:37.360 times and we tend to get perhaps cleaner
00:07:39.570 00:07:39.580 chemistry for your waste products
00:07:41.610 00:07:41.620 however the reactivity is a problem it
00:07:44.880 00:07:44.890 means that it's going to react with a
00:07:47.070 00:07:47.080 whole range of things it might come into
00:07:48.630 00:07:48.640 contact with water for example or worse
00:07:51.450 00:07:51.460 still people keeping m.i.c apart from
00:07:54.870 00:07:54.880 water is vital because if the two
00:07:57.090 00:07:57.100 liquids mix anybody nearby would be in
00:07:59.760 00:07:59.770 serious danger mi c is a highly irritant
00:08:04.410 00:08:04.420 gas it has two important physical
00:08:07.050 00:08:07.060 properties that make it particularly
00:08:08.430 00:08:08.440 unpleasant the first is that it's very
00:08:10.380 00:08:10.390 soluble in water and the second is that
00:08:13.590 00:08:13.600 it vaporizes or boils at a temperature
00:08:16.380 00:08:16.390 almost exactly the same as as the body
00:08:19.200 00:08:19.210 this means that if you inhale mi C at
00:08:21.660 00:08:21.670 low concentrations it's going to effect
00:08:23.790 00:08:23.800 in the first place there's parts of your
00:08:25.350 00:08:25.360 body that are wet which will absorb the
00:08:27.060 00:08:27.070 end mi see that's your eyes your mouth
00:08:29.220 00:08:29.230 your throat and your upper Airways at
00:08:33.030 00:08:33.040 high enough concentrations it'll get the
00:08:34.980 00:08:34.990 whole way down to that part of your lung
00:08:36.600 00:08:36.610 where oxygen is transferred into your
00:08:38.220 00:08:38.230 bloodstream and very similar to the
00:08:40.260 00:08:40.270 effects of phosgene if that part of your
00:08:42.810 00:08:42.820 lung is damaged then serum will flood
00:08:45.150 00:08:45.160 from your bloodstream into your lungs
00:08:46.800 00:08:46.810 and you'll die from a sort of internal
00:08:48.960 00:08:48.970 drowning with water flooding the pipes
00:08:53.220 00:08:53.230 time was running out the tank should
00:08:55.980 00:08:55.990 have been protected from contamination
00:08:57.860 00:08:57.870 but a catalog of failures was about to
00:09:00.660 00:09:00.670 have the most terrible consequences for
00:09:03.120 00:09:03.130 the people of both
00:09:12.060 00:09:12.070 the tragedy at Bhopal happened when some
00:09:15.550 00:09:15.560 35 tons of a lethal chemical called
00:09:18.220 00:09:18.230 methyl isocyanate reacted with water and
00:09:21.220 00:09:21.230 vaporized thousands of people in the
00:09:24.130 00:09:24.140 shanty town that surrounds the plant
00:09:25.810 00:09:25.820 were gassed dying in the same horrific
00:09:29.020 00:09:29.030 way that soldiers were killed in the
00:09:31.060 00:09:31.070 first world war the disaster was due to
00:09:34.930 00:09:34.940 an amazing combination of circumstances
00:09:37.290 00:09:37.300 had each happened on their own the
00:09:39.970 00:09:39.980 accident would never have occurred in
00:09:43.360 00:09:43.370 terms of designing chemical plants there
00:09:45.070 00:09:45.080 are really two sorts of safety one is
00:09:47.560 00:09:47.570 designing the plant to be safe in the
00:09:49.120 00:09:49.130 first place and second is operating it
00:09:51.820 00:09:51.830 safely and at boat pawl there were
00:09:53.860 00:09:53.870 problems in both areas three hours to go
00:09:58.930 00:09:58.940 until the catastrophic release the first
00:10:02.530 00:10:02.540 of many hundreds of liters of water
00:10:04.300 00:10:04.310 found their way from a routine cleaning
00:10:06.790 00:10:06.800 operation into the main pipe system that
00:10:09.520 00:10:09.530 ran throughout the factory it should
00:10:12.370 00:10:12.380 have been impossible for the water to
00:10:13.990 00:10:14.000 get very far but mistake number one had
00:10:17.440 00:10:17.450 already been made a safety procedure
00:10:20.770 00:10:20.780 existed to isolate sections of pipeline
00:10:23.770 00:10:23.780 before they were cleaned
00:10:28.860 00:10:28.870 a simple piece of metal called a slip
00:10:31.500 00:10:31.510 blind is inserted and the bolts turn up
00:10:34.470 00:10:34.480 tight achieving an impenetrable seal
00:10:38.210 00:10:38.220 incredibly this procedure was often
00:10:41.160 00:10:41.170 ignored at Bhopal to install a step line
00:10:44.250 00:10:44.260 like this would probably take about two
00:10:45.990 00:10:46.000 hours and you would have had to wear a
00:10:47.880 00:10:47.890 lot of protective clothing because when
00:10:49.950 00:10:49.960 you undid the bolts of these flanges the
00:10:53.490 00:10:53.500 possibility of chemicals splashing onto
00:10:55.350 00:10:55.360 you would be there if one of these small
00:10:58.440 00:10:58.450 pieces of steel had been inserted into
00:11:00.540 00:11:00.550 the process pipeline in all probability
00:11:03.329 00:11:03.339 this disaster would not have happened by
00:11:08.340 00:11:08.350 now in 30 the warship was able to travel
00:11:10.980 00:11:10.990 freely through the hundreds of metres of
00:11:12.930 00:11:12.940 pipe that separated the main plant from
00:11:15.780 00:11:15.790 the m.i.c storage area and its deadly
00:11:18.329 00:11:18.339 content
00:11:25.170 00:11:25.180 the disaster could still have been
00:11:26.940 00:11:26.950 averted however had the gauges in the
00:11:29.490 00:11:29.500 factories control room been trustworthy
00:11:32.120 00:11:32.130 when this plant was designed and
00:11:34.170 00:11:34.180 installed the instrumentation here was
00:11:36.990 00:11:37.000 probably state of that as far as India
00:11:38.820 00:11:38.830 goes over the years lack of maintenance
00:11:41.240 00:11:41.250 contributed to the instruments given
00:11:43.710 00:11:43.720 faulty readings from time to time which
00:11:45.750 00:11:45.760 probably led to the operators and to the
00:11:48.360 00:11:48.370 staff not taking the readings very
00:11:50.340 00:11:50.350 seriously m.i.c is kept under pressure
00:11:54.660 00:11:54.670 with inert gas to stop anything from
00:11:56.940 00:11:56.950 getting into the tank but for six weeks
00:11:59.850 00:11:59.860 the pressure gauge had read virtually
00:12:01.920 00:12:01.930 zero it was presumed that the gauge was
00:12:04.590 00:12:04.600 faulty in fact there was a leaky valve
00:12:08.580 00:12:08.590 connecting the tank to the plant's main
00:12:10.590 00:12:10.600 pipe system if gas could get out then
00:12:15.570 00:12:15.580 water could get in
00:12:23.340 00:12:23.350 by approximately 10 o'clock the
00:12:26.340 00:12:26.350 contamination had started
00:12:31.480 00:12:31.490 the reaction of em I see em water
00:12:33.280 00:12:33.290 generates carbon dioxide is one of its
00:12:35.470 00:12:35.480 products it also generates heat of
00:12:38.079 00:12:38.089 course the heat starts to warm the
00:12:39.699 00:12:39.709 mixture it's an exothermic reaction as
00:12:42.129 00:12:42.139 we call it what I'm going to do is a
00:12:45.100 00:12:45.110 similar reaction that obviously uses
00:12:47.379 00:12:47.389 much safer chemicals this material is
00:12:55.960 00:12:55.970 going to behave rather like EMI see did
00:13:02.129 00:13:02.139 the material I'm adding is in effect the
00:13:05.169 00:13:05.179 water that was that came into the vessel
00:13:12.790 00:13:12.800 we add that and as you can see gas
00:13:18.260 00:13:18.270 bubbles start to form water is denser
00:13:21.770 00:13:21.780 than m.i.c so it falls to the bottom of
00:13:24.260 00:13:24.270 the vessel the first part of the
00:13:28.010 00:13:28.020 reaction takes place where the two
00:13:29.750 00:13:29.760 layers of liquid meet so this looks
00:13:33.290 00:13:33.300 exactly like the MIT water interface
00:13:35.240 00:13:35.250 would we're generating bubbles at the
00:13:38.810 00:13:38.820 boundary between the two liquid layers
00:13:41.050 00:13:41.060 but the key issue is the heat this heat
00:13:44.420 00:13:44.430 heats up the reaction mixture the
00:13:46.280 00:13:46.290 temperature rises when the temperature
00:13:48.410 00:13:48.420 rises the reaction speeds up and in turn
00:13:51.290 00:13:51.300 generates heat even faster it's what we
00:13:53.690 00:13:53.700 call a runaway even with water in the
00:14:00.290 00:14:00.300 tank it should have been possible to
00:14:02.240 00:14:02.250 control the situation m.i.c has to be
00:14:05.720 00:14:05.730 kept cool and the tanks were housed in a
00:14:08.150 00:14:08.160 concrete bunker insulating them from the
00:14:10.730 00:14:10.740 fierce heat of Central India
00:14:13.820 00:14:13.830 there was also a cooling system
00:14:15.640 00:14:15.650 controlled from a purpose-built
00:14:17.470 00:14:17.480 refrigeration plant the senior
00:14:22.100 00:14:22.110 management however had decided to switch
00:14:25.490 00:14:25.500 it off but Nagisa labonte this wasn't
00:14:28.790 00:14:28.800 running on the night of the tragedy in
00:14:30.560 00:14:30.570 fact it had been off since May 84 the
00:14:34.250 00:14:34.260 coolant inside had been removed and it
00:14:36.350 00:14:36.360 was permanently disabled switching the
00:14:40.760 00:14:40.770 refrigeration off was an insane thing to
00:14:43.280 00:14:43.290 do these reactions these exothermic
00:14:45.440 00:14:45.450 runaway reactions take place when we're
00:14:48.410 00:14:48.420 generating more heat than we can remove
00:14:50.450 00:14:50.460 the refrigeration system was there to
00:14:52.790 00:14:52.800 remove Heat switching it off made this
00:14:55.520 00:14:55.530 instant much much more likely incredibly
00:14:59.270 00:14:59.280 another safety device had been bypassed
00:15:01.850 00:15:01.860 in defiance of Union carbides own
00:15:04.640 00:15:04.650 operating instructions
00:15:09.370 00:15:09.380 see now the reaction is getting quite
00:15:11.770 00:15:11.780 enthusiastic getting some bubbles some
00:15:14.950 00:15:14.960 droplets of liquid coming out at the top
00:15:16.750 00:15:16.760 of the vessel and if this were an
00:15:19.720 00:15:19.730 industrial scale vessel we would have a
00:15:21.970 00:15:21.980 significant emergency on our hands
00:15:24.360 00:15:24.370 at Bhopal there was a machine
00:15:26.860 00:15:26.870 purpose-built to deal with toxic gases a
00:15:29.530 00:15:29.540 device known as a vent gas scrubber
00:15:42.900 00:15:42.910 Kakuma team I saw so you have to be
00:15:46.390 00:15:46.400 Jakob non-government said I've been
00:15:48.430 00:15:48.440 carbon downside god what the Coon Julian
00:15:52.750 00:15:52.760 and I'm like up 30 some can go cool
00:15:55.740 00:15:55.750 Tanja relevant am become development a
00:15:58.540 00:15:58.550 high from one of my top caliber
00:16:00.280 00:16:00.290 exothermic Okumura bikini agua noon come
00:16:03.970 00:16:03.980 come
00:16:04.870 00:16:04.880 me too I saw see any remnants our math
00:16:07.000 00:16:07.010 teacher - an operating Sam Lloyd easy ma
00:16:09.790 00:16:09.800 Kelly you have to take up now who when
00:16:13.090 00:16:13.100 what nah man come here come come long
00:16:16.500 00:16:16.510 forgotten typing until noon Kelly she
00:16:19.240 00:16:19.250 may have hidden come come with you I saw
00:16:21.670 00:16:21.680 say a near these type along and let in
00:16:24.370 00:16:24.380 some more even act with me hey I come on
00:16:26.860 00:16:26.870 demand you long animal quarantine
00:16:29.200 00:16:29.210 somewhat Nick who could have been named
00:16:37.570 00:16:37.580 because I'm I didn't he did it man
00:16:39.670 00:16:39.680 didn't type in ITIN and palm and pin
00:16:42.250 00:16:42.260 calm down I salute my colleague Dan Dan
00:16:45.220 00:16:45.230 like a coon couldn't have to try to blab
00:16:47.950 00:16:47.960 it at all mi see ya
00:16:56.460 00:16:56.470 why have 1/3 diameter you recom 5 how I
00:17:02.020 00:17:02.030 met you
00:18:29.310 00:18:29.320 yeah I can try
00:18:32.380 00:18:32.390 no God what I know I got this heart
00:18:35.860 00:18:35.870 about what if in Vidalia and been denied
00:18:37.870 00:18:37.880 oh no I could to be like cheer
00:18:40.410 00:18:40.420 ha ha ha Visalia Amy Safir Dona yeah the
00:18:46.150 00:18:46.160 park on test may want to burn high
00:18:48.910 00:18:48.920 pressure testing hydro static testing my
00:18:53.500 00:18:53.510 part will come down to telecom operator
00:18:56.610 00:18:56.620 to catch oh god my Banga blue
00:19:38.440 00:19:38.450 let me capture you HR divine have
00:19:42.310 00:19:42.320 provided call choco I've gone let go
00:19:45.750 00:19:45.760 yeah yeah
00:19:49.480 00:19:49.490 think that table passing along believe a
00:19:58.780 00:19:58.790 nun do I have at Bhopal there was a
00:20:04.240 00:20:04.250 machine purpose-built to deal with toxic
00:20:06.610 00:20:06.620 gases a device known as a vent gas
00:20:09.610 00:20:09.620 scrubber yeah mobile plant covering DISA
00:20:13.300 00:20:13.310 scrabbling this is the event guest
00:20:16.030 00:20:16.040 scrubber we had at Beau pearl
00:20:19.590 00:20:19.600 it works by neutralizing toxic gas
00:20:22.690 00:20:22.700 before releasing it into the atmosphere
00:20:25.680 00:20:25.690 without go yes Karabakh on the night
00:20:28.510 00:20:28.520 though it was switched off the
00:20:30.040 00:20:30.050 maintenance mystic on special Tara
00:20:36.130 00:20:36.140 even if this vital piece of equipment
00:20:38.020 00:20:38.030 had been on it was too small to cope
00:20:40.840 00:20:40.850 with the quantity of m.i.c that was now
00:20:42.850 00:20:42.860 out of control
00:20:51.720 00:20:51.730 this is really bubbling violently now
00:20:56.660 00:20:56.670 see lots of gas being generated and of
00:21:00.080 00:21:00.090 course at Bhopal the whole thing was
00:21:02.330 00:21:02.340 happening on a scale a hundred thousand
00:21:04.010 00:21:04.020 times bigger there's absolutely nothing
00:21:07.640 00:21:07.650 that could be done to slow this down
00:21:10.870 00:21:10.880 heat is being generated so fast that on
00:21:14.270 00:21:14.280 an industrial scale we cannot remove it
00:21:16.370 00:21:16.380 quickly enough to stop the reaction this
00:21:19.580 00:21:19.590 is the the worst nightmare for a
00:21:21.290 00:21:21.300 chemical plant operator this is a
00:21:24.470 00:21:24.480 disaster
00:21:28.690 00:21:28.700 vn Singh was working at the plant that
00:21:31.460 00:21:31.470 night and it was his duty to check the
00:21:34.010 00:21:34.020 area where the pipe washing had started
00:21:36.110 00:21:36.120 some four hours earlier by this time
00:21:40.760 00:21:40.770 midnight water was flowing once again
00:21:43.820 00:21:43.830 from the drainage nozzles but he noticed
00:21:46.220 00:21:46.230 that something was wrong the disaster
00:21:50.510 00:21:50.520 was just minutes away was then when I
00:21:55.190 00:21:55.200 got here I saw water running out for the
00:21:57.560 00:21:57.570 bleeders but my eyes started to hurt
00:22:00.160 00:22:00.170 this was quite common at the factory but
00:22:02.510 00:22:02.520 that day it was very very bad so I ran
00:22:05.240 00:22:05.250 to the control room
00:22:08.630 00:22:08.640 what VN Singh saw when he got to the
00:22:11.240 00:22:11.250 control room about a minute later was
00:22:13.490 00:22:13.500 the final stage of a chemical process
00:22:15.560 00:22:15.570 that had been underway for over two
00:22:17.630 00:22:17.640 hours
00:22:25.120 00:22:25.130 at a molecular level things are
00:22:27.039 00:22:27.049 happening extremely fast as the system
00:22:29.919 00:22:29.929 warms up the second reaction kicks in
00:22:32.250 00:22:32.260 trimerization
00:22:33.870 00:22:33.880 reaction between three methyl isocyanate
00:22:36.310 00:22:36.320 molecules that forms a stable molecule
00:22:38.890 00:22:38.900 and generates more heat as each bond is
00:22:42.730 00:22:42.740 made energy is released
00:22:44.770 00:22:44.780 now the m.i.c molecules were able to
00:22:47.770 00:22:47.780 react with themselves all 42 tons of the
00:22:50.830 00:22:50.840 material were free to generate heat
00:22:52.840 00:22:52.850 almost simultaneously the reactions
00:22:55.990 00:22:56.000 getting very violent at the moment
00:22:57.659 00:22:57.669 materials starting to leave the top lots
00:23:00.490 00:23:00.500 of gas being generated bubbles of liquid
00:23:02.980 00:23:02.990 leaving right now with the equipment
00:23:08.440 00:23:08.450 they had at Bhopal there was absolutely
00:23:10.270 00:23:10.280 nothing that could be done to save the
00:23:12.279 00:23:12.289 people
00:23:16.200 00:23:16.210 I think up a 6-day so I came running out
00:23:19.440 00:23:19.450 to tanki 610 and even though it's
00:23:22.049 00:23:22.059 Underground you could hear a terrible
00:23:23.999 00:23:24.009 rumbling noise and the concrete started
00:23:26.190 00:23:26.200 to shake and crack
00:23:32.610 00:23:32.620 the tank was now in serious danger of
00:23:35.250 00:23:35.260 bursting but it held instead a pressure
00:23:39.029 00:23:39.039 relief valve blew and the gas was on its
00:23:43.529 00:23:43.539 deadly way he travelled to the main
00:23:46.350 00:23:46.360 plant structure through the useless vent
00:23:49.019 00:23:49.029 gas and then out
00:23:55.120 00:23:55.130 the gas was carried away by a
00:23:57.620 00:23:57.630 southeasterly wind clear of the plants
00:24:00.110 00:24:00.120 but directly over the sleeping city of
00:24:03.080 00:24:03.090 Bhopal
00:24:31.440 00:24:31.450 when I started working for carbide in
00:24:33.789 00:24:33.799 1971 it was one of the proudest moments
00:24:36.549 00:24:36.559 of my life because I was selected to
00:24:38.200 00:24:38.210 work for Union cover but after that
00:24:40.659 00:24:40.669 disaster I'm ashamed now that I was ever
00:24:43.630 00:24:43.640 associated with the company which did
00:24:45.010 00:24:45.020 not manage to live up to its name and
00:24:47.500 00:24:47.510 reputation in India
Office location
Engineering company LOTUS®
Russia, Ekaterinburg, Lunacharskogo street, 240/12

Phone: +7 343 216 77 75

E-mail: info@lotus1.ru

Sales phone

Russia: +7 343 216 77 75

WhatsApp: +79122710308